Twists and Turns amidst Continuity

The political systems in Cyprus — both on a party level and as a whole — have undergone continuous changes over recent years. The most significant shifts include the declining electoral and political influence of traditional parties over the past 10–15 years and the rise in voter abstention.

These changes are better understood as part of a continuum rather than a sudden break from the past, characterized by both continuities and discontinuities as well as back-and-forth and zig-zag movements. Moreover, these developments should be viewed as interconnected components of a whole, rather than as isolated events.

The recent dual elections in Cyprus, both European and local, provided further evidence of the ongoing changes. However, the extent, scale, and direction of these changes were unexpected. This situation exemplifies the latest twist in a narrative of continuous change.

In the following analysis, I highlight several issues arising from the simultaneous European and local elections held on 9 June 2024, focusing primarily on the European election results, which offer a more robust basis for analysing the party system. It is important to note that the local elections somewhat distorted the European election results. Many voters felt that supporting their party in the local elections gave them the freedom to vote differently in the European elections.

The Peculiarity of the Dual Elections

In Cyprus, European and local (municipal) elections were held simultaneously for the first time, with each election characterized by its distinct features and dynamics. Local elections are strongly influenced by candidates’ individual characteristics, while European elections are heavily shaped by partisan tendencies. In municipal elections, voting is highly personal, not least because of the large number of candidates, a factor that is even more significant in a small country like Cyprus.

Moreover, there were no broad and stable alliances between parties that would allow for a consistent evaluation of electoral dynamics as they may be applicable to the more significant parliamentary and presidential elections. In contrast, voting in the European elections is typically less driven by conviction, with lower stakes and turnout, similar to trends seen across the EU. Both municipal and European elections are considered second-order elections, serving as opportunities for voters to convey messages.

The campaign was once again entirely Cyprus-centred.

Given the nature of the European elections, they revealed surprises, upheavals, and continuities, while also exposing, to an even greater extent, the major pathologies of the Cypriot party system, which has long been engulfed in a drawn-out, and multi-faceted crisis. The Cypriot party system is marked by fluidity, with all the previous constants on which it has historically been based having thoroughly dissolved (e.g., ideology, partisanship), creating an unstable environment. While public opinion polls have somewhat captured the electoral trends, they have not fully accounted for the extent of this instability, especially when it comes to the “Fidias effect” (explained below).

The Pre-Electoral Political Situation

During the campaign, polls predicted a close race for top spot between the right-wing DISY and the left-wing AKEL, with a slight advantage expected for AKEL. This expectation was partly due to AKEL making a direct appeal to Turkish Cypriots (TCs) by once again fielding a TC candidate, one who is also a current member of the European Parliament (EP).

The most significant question posed by these elections was whether the far-right party, the National Popular Front (ELAM), would surpass the centre-right Democratic Party (DIKO) to take third place. All polls predicted that ELAM would secure third place. The socially democratic EDEK, which held the sixth EP seat, was expected to lose it. The high threshold for representation in Cyprus (16.6 percent), allowing only six seats, appeared detrimental for all other low-polling parties.

The campaign was once again entirely Cyprus-centred, with only national issues emphasized. These primarily revolved around the state of the economy, especially as it pertained to the rising cost of living, immigration, and corruption. The previously dominant “Cyprus problem” remained on the sidelines. European issues were largely ignored, and all parties directly linked the stakes of the election to national issues and concerns.

The Results

The election results highlighted both winners and losers, which must be distinguished in electoral and political terms (Table 1). The most shocking outcome was the surprisingly high score of 24-year-old YouTuber and TikToker Fidias Panayiotou, who stormed to 19.4 percent of the vote.

Table 1: European Election Results

Politically, the results conveyed five important messages: a) disapproval of the traditional parties; b) the continued rise of the far-right ELAM, which captured one of the six EP seats for the first time; c) AKEL’s ongoing struggles and inability to capitalize on political opportunities, resulting in the loss of one seat and the failure to achieve re-election for the TC member of the EP; d) the poor performance of the governing parties; e) an overall increase in turnout, but a decrease in TC participation.

Increased Turnout, but Turkish Cypriots Turn Their Backs

Holding the local and European elections simultaneously was aimed at boosting voter participation, and this goal can be considered satisfactorily achieved. Turnout increased to 58.86 percent compared with the 44.99 percent seen in 2019. Consequently, the electoral measure rose: 1 percent of the vote represented about 3,700 votes in 2024, compared to approximately 2,900 in 2019. However, in order to fully assess the success of this venture (the merging of the two elections), we will need to observe turnout rates over the next one to two election cycles.

We should also focus on the qualitative aspects of the turnout, not just the numerical ones. For instance, it is unlikely that the increased turnout was due to a heightened interest in European issues, as the EU still struggles to mobilize voters. Moreover, we must study electoral behaviour and changes in electoral sociology in depth, as the Cypriot voter and Cypriot society as a whole has arguably changed significantly in recent times.

All traditional and mainstream parties are among the losers of these elections.

TCs did not significantly contribute to the increased turnout, as their participation remained quite limited. In 2024, 5,676 TCs came to the polls out of approximately 103,000 eligible voters, compared to 5,804 in 2019 when there were around 20,000 fewer eligible voters. This low turnout is significant both politically and numerically, affecting parties that might have benefited from their participation. The limited turnout had a more considerable impact on the left, i.e., AKEL, which was relying on TC votes to increase its share and vie for first place. AKEL received 4,485 votes from TCs in 2024, up from 4,076 in 2019. However, due to the increase in the overall electorate, the impact of these votes was diminished: in 2019, TC votes accounted for about 1.5 percent of AKEL’s total vote, whereas in 2024 this contribution dropped to 1.2 percent.

The low turnout of TCs certainly requires more in-depth expert analysis, but some working hypotheses include: frustration over the ongoing deadlock in talks concerning the Cyprus problem, leading to pessimism about their future and thus not fostering conditions for their mobilization; pressures from the regime in the occupied areas and from Turkey against participating in an election organized by the Republic of Cyprus; opposition from circles within the TC left who disagreed with voting in these elections; and possibly the failure of Turkish Cypriot candidates to generate interest within the community.

The Crisis of Political Representation

The detachment of the party system from its social base is the most significant aspect of the overall crisis in Cyprus’s political system, and serves to highlight its depth. Analysing the actual number of participants illustrates the widespread crisis affecting the country as a whole: the crisis of political parties as foundational institutions and mechanisms of political representation. The actual influence of parties in society is much weaker than their electoral percentages suggest (see Table 2).

Table 2: Parties’ Results as a Percentage of Registered Voters

The overall representation of traditional political parties (excluding Fidias and other non-traditional groups) amounts to just 42.36 percent. This figure was achieved under conditions of increased turnout, which is uncommon for European elections, and with the participation of several thousand people not registered on the electoral rolls. Looking at the entire post-1974 era as a whole, the main conclusion to be drawn is that political parties’ status as the primary vehicle of political representation has deteriorated to the point where it’s uncertain whether the situation is reversible. This is an issue that extends beyond Cyprus.

The Traditional Parties Lost…

All traditional and mainstream parties are among the losers of these elections. While some lost more than others, all experienced a decline in their vote share, with most also seeing a drop in the actual number of their voters. The most concerning aspect for these parties is the voting behaviour of the younger and more dynamic age groups. According to exit polls, all parties except ELAM registered low to very low scores among these cohorts, indicating a future that is not particularly promising.

DISY appears to be bearing the consequences of its internal division during the 2023 presidential election. However, this event was just the latest in a series of issues and internal contradictions within the party, which are primarily of an ideological and political nature. These problems have piled up over the years and taken a cumulative toll on the party. While securing first place cushions the defeat to some extent, it remains a defeat nonetheless. DISY lost 4.22 percent of its electoral support compared to the previous European elections and recorded its lowest-ever percentage in an election of any kind.

DIKO suffered a 4.1 percent decrease compared to 2019, marking its lowest score in EP election history, and lost the symbolically and substantively crucial third place in the party rankings. EDEK also saw a significant decline in its vote share (-5.48 percent) and lost its sole EP seat. Democratic Front (DIPA) and the Greens are now in a challenging position due to substantial electoral losses. As DIKO, EDEK, and DIPA form part of the governing coalition, the message to the government is demonstrably a negative one. Volt Cyprus did not perform as strongly as anticipated but achieved a relatively positive outcome, establishing itself on the political map, and is now able to set its sights on the 2026 parliamentary election, although its long-term durability and viability remain uncertain.

…And the Far-Right Won (Again)

The rise of the (mutant) far-right ELAM, while not as sharp as anticipated, shows continued growth, both in terms of percentages (+2.95 percent) and votes (+18,048). ELAM is solidifying its political and social presence across Cyprus, successfully securing seats in all of the municipal councils they contested. In Larnaca, the party’s mayoral candidate and EP candidate outperformed the DISY candidate. While ELAM was somewhat constrained by the “Fidias phenomenon” in terms of electoral impact, it was less affected than other parties. It stands out as the sole victorious party in these elections. ELAM will now join the ECR political group in the EP, enhancing its visibility, legitimacy, and networking opportunities.

The TikToker/Youtuber “Phenomenon”

The election of Fidias, a 24-year-old TikToker and YouTuber without academic qualifications, prior political experience, or policy proposals, was undoubtedly the most significant aspect of the election and a clear sign of the electorate’s desire for change. His success can be interpreted in various ways, but ultimately, Fidias is merely the latest in a series of “messengers” who have highlighted a political system in decay. Decreased voter turnout, abstention, the sharp decline in support for traditional parties, disillusionment with political parties, a refusal to register for the electoral rolls, waning trust in political institutions, and protest voting are all signs of a dysfunctional and ineffective political system that have been present in Cyprus now for many years.

Fidias garnered votes from nearly one in five voters, and proved even more popular among the youth population. According to exit polls, he received 39 percent of votes from those aged 24 and younger, 28 percent from the 25–34 age group, and 19 percent from individuals aged 35–44. He outperformed all political parties across all age groups except among those aged 65 and older. A significant portion of his support came from voters who had abstained in previous elections. In addition, he also secured 10 percent of his votes from DISY supporters, 8 percent from AKEL, and another 8 percent from ELAM.

All of the traditional parties are grappling with a search for political identity and direction that extends beyond the simplistic dilemma between being in government or opposition and the mere rotation of leadership as a panacea to conflict.

His election was an exceedingly rare political event, leaving uncertainty about whether it will be repeated. Various interpretations have attempted to make sense of his election. One explanation suggests that his election reflects the ongoing changes and prolonged fluidity witnessed in the Cypriot party system. It is seen as another instance in a series of elections and politics as a whole becoming gradually depoliticized, whereby political processes become individualized and there is a reluctance towards collective action.

It also signifies growing frustration and anger towards the political establishment, revealing the chronic pathologies present in the political structure and party systems. Moreover, it indicates substantial shifts in the electorate and Cypriot society at large, both of which are increasingly becoming disenchanted with politics. His election could also be viewed as a risk--free “anti-system” vote that reflects a latent tendency in the electorate, one which serves as a protest against the system in a way that minimizes repercussions for the establishment. As one academic aptly put it, Fidias’ election represents a “mockery, derision, and carnivalization of political life”.

The expanded use of social media and unmediated communication with citizens, particularly young people, certainly played a key role. Social media creates a more personal and experiential form of communication. In this environment, today’s likes can easily translate into tomorrow’s votes. Fidias expertly showed how this can be done.

All of the interpretations above appear plausible as alternatives and/or complementarily. The protest vote is certainly not uniform, as it stems from a range of motivations and perspectives. What requires deeper examination, given Fidias Panayiotou’s voter profile and his complete lack of political proposals and experience, is the (ongoing) transformation seen in Cypriot voters’ electoral behaviour. This includes the evolving profile of the Cypriot voter, their motives and criteria for political participation, and the transformation of the means and institutions of political socialization, among other factors.

What This Means for the Party System

Assessing the impact of the election result on the party system’s ideological centre of gravity is challenging due to Fidias’s widespread support, which spans across various ideological and political segments, obscuring a precise evaluation. However, it appears reasonable to suggest that the ideological balance of power in Cypriot society is steadily shifting rightward. ELAM’s continued rise and success in securing the pivotal third place represents a significant qualitative development for the future trajectory of the Cypriot party system and the potential alliances it may foster. The municipal election results merit separate analysis, as they appear to mask distinct dynamics and trends, particularly in certain electorates.

All of the traditional parties, but especially the two major ones, are grappling with a search for political identity and direction that extends beyond the simplistic dilemma between being in government or opposition and the mere rotation of leadership as a panacea to conflict. The era of “umbrella parties” able to unify despite internal ideological differences seems to have passed.

The Cypriot Left is diminishing on the electoral level.

The narrative of participating in government is proving to be a temporary adhesive, subject to great sensitivity and a variety of different factors. Political parties have opted to prioritize political communication over policy proposals and agendas for years now. Increasing follower numbers social media and lifestyle politics have taken precedence, even though this approach is detrimental to political parties, which are inherently political organizations. Emphasizing spectacle over substance risks undermining their own credibility.

The Cypriot party system is experiencing a period of fragmentation. While mainstream parties still maintain considerable strength, there is growing fluidity and electoral volatility. This is evident in the declining combined electoral results of the two major parties and all traditional mainstream parties as a whole. This environment enables newcomers or parties with short life cycles to capitalize on temporary, circumstantial, or longer-term gaps in political representation and perform well in specific elections.

The State of the Cypriot Left

The Cypriot Left is diminishing on the electoral level. AKEL was the biggest loser in the European elections. This poses significant challenges for the party, which is currently the sole parliamentary representative of the Left in Cyprus. It makes it exceedingly difficult for the party to wield political influence and exert pressure on the government and other parties for the benefit of the working class and the less affluent segments of society. While AKEL’s electoral performance in municipal elections may have been stronger, the dynamics and considerations at play in those elections were fundamentally different.

AKEL was the sole leftist party to participate in the elections, and the only party clearly positioned in opposition. It is also worth noting that all other parties, with the exception of ELAM, encountered significant challenges, with DISY in particular standing out, although the centre-left parties (EDEK and the Greens) and the centre-right DIKO also suffered. The political landscape was therefore highly favourable to AKEL for the first time since it lost executive power in 2013. Once again, however, it failed to capitalize on this opportunity, achieving its lowest-ever result in history, declining by nearly 6 percent compared to the 2019 European elections and even falling below its previous worst performance in the 2021 parliamentary elections (22.34 percent). What’s more, AKEL lost its second seat in the European Parliament, which constitutes a profoundly negative development for the party.

Overall, the Cypriot Left failed to capitalize electorally on the government’s shortcomings and the challenges facing other parties. The party’s message did not travel beyond its core supporters. AKEL’s involvement in government continues to hinder its ability to mobilize support, particularly when it comes to regaining trust from the electorate. Many former AKEL voters still abstain from supporting the party, highlighting the party’s struggle to reconnect with them. The emergence of Volt Cyprus has also had a negative impact on AKEL, as many who joined and voted for Volt were previously aligned with AKEL due to shared positions on the Cyprus problem in recent elections.