Mozambique’s Spiralling Violence

For years now, conditions verging on civil war have prevailed in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province, going largely unnoticed by the rest of the world. The current cycle of violence began in 2017 when an Islamist extremist group attacked local police stations. Al-Shabaab, known locally as Mashababos, seeks to implement Sharia law. The group is also referred to as the Islamic State in Mozambique, after declaring its allegiance to the so-called Islamic State some years back.

The jihadist violence came to a head in attacks on strategically vital locations such as the port of Mocimboa da Praia, captured in August 2020, and the city of Palma, temporarily conquered in March 2021. The armed conflict has also led to population displacement — the number of internal refugees from the conflict has been as high as 800,000; currently there are around 100,000.

For a while it looked like the deployments of Mozambican and foreign security forces would be able to force the armed groups to retreat. In August 2023, government troops killed the leader of al-Shabaab, Bonomade Machude Omar. But since the beginning of this year, hardly a day has gone by without reports of attacks on villages, leaving burnt-out homes, schools, and churches in their wake.

While the causes of the conflict in Cabo Delgado are complex, several important factors can be identified. Firstly, parts of the Muslim population in the region have become radicalized since the early 2000s. The religious extremism is, however, overlaid by ethnic tensions and rivalries between the Mwani and the Makonde. The latter are considered privileged; this impression is reinforced by the fact that the president, Filipe Nyusi, who governs in the distant capital Maputo, is himself a Makonde.

There is another key factor: the economic and social marginalization of Cabo Delgado. This was already the case during Portuguese colonial rule and continued after Mozambique won its independence in 1975. Despite rampant poverty, the province, located in the peripheral north, receives barely any attention or even aid from Maputo.

Africa’s Largest Gas Project

However, in recent years Cabo Delgado has increasingly come into the sights of large corporations. The ENI corporation from Italy, the US-American ExxonMobil, and TotalEnergies from France have all been salivating over the huge natural gas reserves turned up by prospectors in 2009. TotalEnergies and its partners announced their intention to invest up to 20 billion US dollars in the opening up and extraction of these gas reserves — making it one of the biggest investment projects on the entire African continent.

To satisfy the wishes of the Total corporation, the government established a special zone in Cabo Delgado and granted a territorial concession of more than 6,000 hectares. The area will be filled up with airports, harbours, and infrastructure. At the same time, this is how the investment project — viewed with suspicion by the local populace — has led to the expulsion of hundreds of families from their land, increasing the sense of marginalization and fuelling the violence.

Between the various belligerents — Islamist forces, the Mozambique army, private security forces, and soldiers from foreign armies — the local population is caught in the crossfire.

The inauguration of the gas project not only intensified social conflicts, but militarization as well, with the Total group demanding security forces to defend its major investment. Mozambican troops have set up three bases in the immediate vicinity of Total’s project. The company suspended works after the attack on Palma, however. According to the company’s own statements, its current aim is to resume the gas project by the end of the year.

Total is not only being criticized for forcing the militarization of the region in order to shield its extractivist project. In October 2023, survivors and relatives of the victims of the Palma attack filed a civil suit against the group for negligence and failure to provide reasonable assistance. During the attack, the military’s forces concentrated on defending the project sites, which left many civilians unprotected. Some were even refused permission to flee to the areas the military was defending. At the beginning of May this year, word got out that the French public prosecutor’s office was investigating TotalEnergies regarding this matter.

Foreign Military Missions

As the Mozambique government was unable to put a lid on the violence and terror in the province, it began hiring military contractors, primarily Russian and South African mercenaries. When these forces were also defeated, the government then sought help from abroad. The peacekeeping mission of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been on the ground since July 2021 under the name SAMIM (SADC Mission in Mozambique). As their mandate is soon to expire, in recent weeks the SAMIM troops have started leaving Cabo Delgado.

The rationale behind the withdrawal has various explanations. While Mozambique’s foreign minister, Veronica Macamo, claimed that SAMIM was suffering from a lack of funding, Filimão Suaze, the spokesperson for the Mozambican Council of Ministers, said that SAMIM was pulling out because it had fulfilled its mission. The latter claim seems merely to be a smokescreen, as the insurgency has been intensifying again since January. A third interpretation is more plausible: tensions are mounting between the Mozambique government and the SADC because SADC heads of state were opposed to the deployment of Rwandan troops to Cabo Delgado.

And in fact, Rwandan soldiers will be the only ones remaining from the SAMIM mission, in addition to South African and Tanzanian troops who were not part of the SADC’s military deployment. Rwanda has 3,500 soldiers on the ground, reinforced with a further 2,000 since the SAMIM mission began its withdrawal.

Kigali is committing forces in pursuit of its own interests — under its autocratic president Paul Kagame, Rwanda is particularly striving for greater geopolitical influence in eastern and southern Africa. Critics also suspect that Kagame wants to draw attention away from his role in the eastern Congolese civil war. And lastly, Rwanda is targeting its own dissident citizens abroad, and requires the goodwill of the Mozambican authorities to do so. Indeed, the parliament of Mozambique ratified a controversial extradition agreement with Rwanda at the end of February. Despite assurances from Minister of Justice Helena Kida that no dissidents would be extradited, Rwandan refugees in Mozambique are living in fear of that very prospect.

Mozambique and Rwanda are obviously seeking to forge closer ties. In June, President Nyusi secretly visited Kigali, accompanied by Daniel Chapo, the ruling FRELIMO party’s candidate for the October presidential elections. In the preceding weeks he had met with Kagame multiple times. The managing director of TotalEnergies, Patrick Pouyanné, was also present at two of these meetings, and ENI head Claudio Descalzi was at another. Clearly there are a range of overlapping interests involved.

Only a combination of security, humanitarian aid, and poverty relief can ease hostilities.

To support the Mozambican armed forces in the fight against violence and terror, in July 2021 the EU approved the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM-Moz). This mission is training army units that are now part of Mozambique’s “rapid reaction forces”. The mission involves 119 military personnel from 13 member states; more than half belong to Portugal, the former colonial ruler. The EU has also provided 89 million euro of support to Mozambique’s armed forces.

At the beginning of this year the Mozambique government requested that the EU prolong the training mission. In mid-May, the European Council voted to extend the mandate until 30 June 2026. The extension also comes with a change: the Council approved transitioning the deployment from being a training mission to a support mission, combining advice, mentoring, and specialized training for the rapid reaction forces. This new strategic direction has been signalled with a name change — the “training” mission is now a “military support mission” (EUMAM Mozambique). That is not all: according to a recent Bloomberg news report, the EU may beef up its support for Rwanda’s troops too. One proposal envisages Brussels providing the Rwandan defence forces with 40 million euros for equipment and air transportation.

Major Uncertainty

The humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado is extremely precarious. The World Food Programme has repeatedly denounced the rising food prices. In addition, heavy April rainfall caused food shortages, as roads and bridges could not be used to distribute food aid.

Between the various belligerents — Islamist forces, the Mozambique army, private security forces, and soldiers from foreign armies — the local population is caught in the crossfire. They are confronting not only the social and economic consequences of the conflict, but also a permanent military threat, without themselves being provided with any protection.

Although many activists take a critical view of the militarization of the province, they absolutely acknowledge the necessity of a military presence. Following a phase in which the jihadists were in retreat, the conflict on the ground has once again escalated. This casts considerable doubt on the government’s ability to gain control of the situation and restore peace in Cabo Delgado.

At the same time, many commentators stress that a one-dimensional focus on security does not help the situation; only a combination of security, humanitarian aid, and poverty relief can ease hostilities. Analyst Borges Nhamirre criticizes the Mozambique government for so far having failed to recognize poverty, unemployment, and social inequality as drivers of conflict. He urges the government to rethink its approach, including by offering an opportunity for dialogue between the various parties to the conflict. Even if the outcome of such an offer is totally uncertain, one thing is clear: further militarization will not put an end to the violence.

This article first appeared in nd.Aktuell in collaboration with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Translated by Sam Langer and Rowan Coupland for Gegensatz Translation Collective.