Gen-Z Is Reshaping Kenyan Politics

Kenya, like most of its neighbours in East Africa, faces significant internal political, social, and economic challenges. Although one of Africa’s largest and fastest-growing economies, a small elite has raked in most of the profits during the boom of the last decade. Meanwhile, global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund have pushed neoliberal economic policies onto the government, which have seen it slash public spending and raise taxes on everyday goods at a time when the average Kenyan spends over half of their income on food alone.

Yet a new demographic born between 1997–2012 and known as Generation Z, or “Gen-Z”, is not taking these challenges lying down. Educated, politically conscious, and tech-savvy, Gen-Z have built a vibrant political movement decrying Kenya’s lack of economic opportunities, the rising cost of living, and unchecked corruption by the political elite. In June of this year, the government’s passing of a controversial Finance Bill sparked mass demonstrations that soon grew deadly. Yet protesters pressed on, culminating in broader political demands including the resignation of Kenyan president William Ruto.

Although the demonstrations eventually subsided without forcing Ruto’s resignation, the Gen-Z movement remains very active and promises to be a new force within the Kenyan political landscape. The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Samuel Kasirye spoke to Kenyan activists Julia Kamau and Irene Asuwa to get more insight into the state of play in Kenyan politics three months later, and the prospects for the movement going forward.

This summer, we saw widespread protests across Kenya against a planned government finance bill. Can you tell us a bit about the bill and why it sparked such outrage?

JK: The Gen-Z demonstrations have their roots in a myriad of political, economic, and political failings that have built up for decades. However, the spark of the deadly June riots was the passing of the now withdrawn 2024 Finance Bill, which proposed new tax measures that would have further exacerbated the cost-of-living crisis. Through this Finance Bill, the Kenyan government had anticipated raising an additional 2.7 billion US dollars to reduce budget deficits and service loans. The new measures were going to affect basic foodstuffs like maize flour, cooking oil, bread, and other essential commodities like sanitary products.

IA: Alongside the Finance Bill, the Kenyan government had tabled various pieces of anti-citizen legislation before parliament including the controversial Land Laws Amendment Bill, the Assembly and Demonstrations Bill, and the Carbon Market Regulations. The proposed legislation sought to pose limits on people’s right to land, food, livelihoods, and free assembly. Therefore, the government’s insensitivity around the Finance Bill, a host of unpopular pieces of legislation, and protracted civil service strikes came together to create fertile ground for the demonstrations.

The protests were very much youth-led. Can you tell us more about the organizations and networks behind the protests? What do you think they can tell us about the shape of political opposition in Kenya today? What has changed from previous protest waves?

JK: The Gen-Z demonstrations assumed a party-less, tribe-less, and fearless identity. Unlike previous actions, a majority of the actors this time came from a young, educated, and middle-class demographic — a once privileged socioeconomic category in Kenya that increasingly faces a lack of opportunities.

IA: The youth movement is not affiliated with any of the established political groups, and its actions this time around extended beyond the confines of major cities like Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. The political action was wholly democratized — the action was not left to the most disadvantaged youth and activists. For the first time, young people cut ties with corporate entities and leaders, whom they felt were complicit in Kenya’s governance issues.

Another unique part of these actions was a heightened sense of solidarity and comradeship. Young people took up roles of providing onsite medical treatment for victims, providing free legal aid services, medical and fundraising resources for the demonstration actions.

With regard to the state of political opposition, we do not think we have an official opposition in Kenya at the moment — the people have assumed the role of the opposition.

The Kenyan government’s response to the protests was initially violent. What led to President Ruto’s change of attitude, and what significant political changes have happened since the demonstrations?

JK: The Gen-Z protests were almost spontaneous in nature, the government and security services did not expect such activity across the country. The police initially reacted violently, killing over 40 demonstrators and injuring over 300.

Beyond calls for removing the current regime, it is essential to work towards an alternative that puts citizens at the centre of its organization — a new, progressive social contract that restructures Kenya’s capitalist economic and political system.

However, after internal and external pressure, President Ruto withdrew the Finance Bill, dismissed all members of his cabinet, and appointed a new cabinet to include his main critics. In a change of stance, Ruto directly engaged the youth on social media platforms. These actions by the president significantly cooled the political temperatures at the time, as the demonstrators had expanded their demands to include the resignation of the president.

Prior to the riots, Kenya was praised for its democratic credentials by the United States and the EU, and also designated a major non-NATO ally in May 2024. How could President Ruto’s reaction to the demonstrations affect these relationships?

IA: The Ruto administration’s relationship with the United States and the European Union after the Gen-Z demonstrations remains unchanged and has returned to business as usual. There were no strong actions from the US or EU despite the gross civil rights violations during these demonstrations. Young people lost their lives, many of which remain unaccounted for, abductions have been reported, and yet there is no strong criticism of President Ruto from his key Western allies.

In fact, what we’re seeing is actually an increase in pro-Western, foreign direct investment-orientated initiatives from the administration. For example, Kenya and Germany concluded a Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement this September, which will allow semi-skilled Kenyans to work in various fields in Germany. Similarly, Kenya and the US are in the advanced negotiating stages of concluding a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Many of the features of the Gen-Z movement — its reliance on digital organizing, its claims to leaderlessness — resemble earlier protest waves in other parts of the world like Occupy or the Arab Spring. What do you think the Kenyan movement can learn from these previous experiences?

JK: The youth being at the forefront of the demonstrations is unique to the Kenyan context. That said, I don’t think young people’s demands for change are specific to Kenya — similar actions have happened next door in Sudan. However, what we have learned from the Arab Spring is the art of harnessing social media, different groups organizing autonomously, and most importantly mobilizing action among the educated, normally apolitical middle-class. We think the most important lessons from the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring are to how to organize outside established political structures and unify the various struggles among farmers, teachers, and medical practitioners.

IA: The Gen-Z demonstrations had some weaknesses. For example, we made more constitutional demands than political ones. We think our strategies should go beyond reforming the Kenyan constitution. The current administration was never a believer in the constitution, which, despite its progressive elements, has been subject to abuse by the political elite. Therefore, I think that beyond calls for removing the current regime, it is essential to work towards an alternative that puts citizens at the centre of its organization — a new, progressive social contract that restructures Kenya’s capitalist economic and political system.

Do you feel that the Gen-Z protests were hijacked by the old political oligarchy that has now made its way into government?

IA: I don’t think that the process has been hijacked, because established parties weren’t part of the Gen-Z movement in the first place. The old political class led by former Deputy President Raila Odinga did not shape the actions of the demonstrations — our demands as young people are different from theirs. For example, one of our demands is the removal of the President Ruto regime, while we can see that their ambition is to partake in political manoeuvres to join the current government.

This is a crucial time in Kenyan politics. Young people are taking an active role in citizenship and renegotiating their status within Kenya’s political fabric.

Historically, Kenyan opposition leaders have tapped into such popular movements to advance their political agendas, and, of course, sections of the youth movement could be co-opted by the political elite. However, the battle lines are now clearly drawn between citizens and the current elite political class. At the moment, politicians from both the current government and opposition are increasingly being de-platformed and their visibility within the public realm is significantly diminished. This gives us hope that our messages of defiance to the political class are being heard.

The political actions we have started are going to be hard and protracted, and, of course, we expect challenges. Nonetheless, for this movement to gain lasting political traction, we need to maintain independence, set clear goals that differentiate us from the political establishment, and focus on grassroots organizing rather than aligning with traditional political parties.

Is it possible that the Gen-Z movement will disrupt established voting patterns in Kenya’s general election in 2027?

IA: Yes, we definitely see some indicators of that happening. Currently, young people are leading a process to recall three Members of Parliament who supported the controversial Finance Bill from their constituencies. There is also a renewed proliferation of new political demands for things like an independent probe into the deaths of demonstrators, an audit of Kenya’s national debt, and demands for the reconstitution of the Kenya Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission charged with organizing elections.

JK: It is also important to note that over 8 million voters did not participate in the 2022 general election, a majority of whom were young voters. However, with this momentum, we are likely to see more young people take an active role in electoral politics. This could tip the balance in the general elections in 2027. In addition, political parties are becoming less relevant to how the youth organize, which is also likely to affect the politics of tribal affiliation that has dominated Kenyan politics for decades.

This is a crucial time in Kenyan politics. Young people are taking an active role in citizenship and renegotiating their status within Kenya’s political fabric.