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CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION AND STRUCTURE

The horrendous terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (with the possibility that the third unarmed hijacked airliner was heading for the Capitol Hill) has led to numerous analysis of the phenomenon, its causes, and the implications of this unique act. We are much too close to the event and deeply influenced by its gravity to be able to make a clear judgement of the impact of global and regional security, especially in Asia and Europe. Many have defined it as the beginning of the third world war. Such a war would be fought across national frontiers, but unlike the earlier wars, would take place between the civilised state protecting society on one side and the states and non-state actors seeking to alter the existing framework. Others have felt that the war against terrorism is misleading concept. But what is clear is that the event serves as another benchmark against which we may reassess the current security situation in the world at large and Asia-Europe in particular.

Security landscape

The central geo-strategic issue in examining the security landscape is the nature of the international order. But the problem is made much more difficult due to the fact that, while the Cold War has been over for more than a decade, the mindsets of that period have not dissipated fully leave alone adjusted to the altered framework of new geo-strategic realities. For example, there is a strong tendency to view the future purely in terms of the past, and this tends to cloud our vision for the future. This is perhaps most visible in the arena of the assessment of the international order.

The greatest challenge for the international community now is how to dissolve the debris of the Cold War, and manage the emergence of alternate framework for peace and security. This debris is spread right across the globe, ranging from South America to Africa, Europe and Asia which are now dotted with imploded or imploding states. At one level this can be seen in terms of nearly 75 million sophisticated military-specification small arms and light weapons diffused into society outside government control thus undermining the traditional monopoly of the sovereign state over the instruments of violence. This had started to happen during the Cold War mostly as part of the strategy of Cold War rivalries and merged into regional powers pursuing their own agendas as the “low cost” option to apply force with minimal risks of punitive retaliation. At another level we have witnessed the extremist forms of violent religion and ideology being fused into political war through other means of which Afghanistan in the 1980s was a prime example. The image of Soviet withdrawal (and hence the “defeat” of a super power by Islamist holy warriors) as a consequence of the Afghan jehad provided the incentive to pursue this strategy further by regional powers like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia pursuing their own agendas besides entities like the Al-Qaeda and individuals like Osama bin-Laden supported by them but also in search of their own ideologies and political goals.

This debris, in every aspect, is perhaps the greatest in the continents of Asia and Europe along with their contiguous regions like the Horn of Africa. At the core is the problem that the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, but this unique historical change does not seem to be adequately reflected in the thinking and policy of leadership across the world. For example, militarisation of foreign policy has not been wound down, but in many cases new forms of militarisation, like the use of sponsored political use of religious terrorism, acquired added salience. This had acquired special characteristics during the last decade of the Cold War when it was taken forward to a more vicious system under the Taliban.

The increasing marginalisation of the UN system naturally has a serious negative implication for international peace and security. The League of Nations came up as an institution for collective security, and its failure to avert the second world war led to the establishment of the UN for preventive diplomacy. With all its inherent weaknesses the UN performed a valuable role in enhancing international peace and security. However, the basic structure reflected the nature of the international order at the end of the Second World War in 1945. More than five decades later and even after a decade has gone by since the end of Cold War, the UN, if anything, has been marginalized largely because of the unilateralist policies of the dominant power and the fact that the UN no longer represents the geopolitical realities of today leave alone their vector for the future.

Strategic Stability

The paradigm of strategic stability as it evolved during the Cold War, with all its weaknesses, has all but disappeared. But a new framework has yet to emerge. The basic framework of arms control has altered from the essentially because the bilateral paradigm of the bipolar Cold War to an increasingly multi-polar world where the interests of a number of autonomous powers have to be accommodated into any arms control and strategic stability paradigm. The current phase of transition in reality presents the world with many challenges as well as opportunities. But it appears that little effort is being made to evolve a suitable model which would reflect the altered geopolitical realities on one side and the nature of strategic challenges in the coming decades on the other.

At the apex of the security challenges is the issue of arms control and strategic stability. US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the demise of START agreement, the coma into which the CTBT has slipped after the US Senate dealt a head-blow to it, and the still-born FMCT are but some of the examples of the collapse of the arms control regime crafted so carefully and painstakingly during the Cold War. In fact many knowledgeable people estimate that the United States may re-commence nuclear testing sooner rather than later. This would inevitably open a Pandora's Box with Russia following suit and China not too far behind.

The US-Russia announcement to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons down to around 2,000 each is a welcome step but fall far short of what could be logically possible more than a decade after the Cold War ended and Russia was formally included in NATO structures. The decommissioned weapons are not planned by either country to be destroyed. On the other hand the reported Nuclear Posture Review of the United States provides a strong indication of the willingness to use nuclear weapons even in non-nuclear scenarios and under conditions of pre-emption. There has been a noticeable global withdrawal of support to abolition of nuclear weapons.

Measures to enhance stability and reduce nuclear risks and dangers (like banning the threat and use of nuclear weapons) have not found favor with the dominant powers. Only China and India are committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons strictly for defence only against nuclear threat. They have also adopted the doctrine of minimum (though credible) nuclear deterrence. Other nuclear weapon states continue to pursue strategy of first or even early use while pushing for retaining huge quantities of nuclear weapons. Overall, the salience of nuclear weapons has been increasing rather than reducing in recent years. This has far reaching consequences for security in future since it provides a strong incentive for countries to acquire nuclear weapons.

Ballistic Missile Defences

The shift toward ballistic missile defences (BMD, which includes both national as well as theatre missile defences) is altering the basic deterrence paradigm toward an uncertain offence-cum-defence framework. Asia and Europe are the most affected continents by the move toward missile defences. The United States is well set on the path to further

development and deployment of missile defences both at the national as well as at the theatre levels. Russia and China are likely to adopt counter-BMD measures for their own defence as well for managing the global strategic balance. Their own search for missile defences would be expedited in this process. This would have a profound impact on nuclear doctrines and strategies among nuclear weapon states, including India. At the minimum, the level of minimum deterrence would undergo changes if deterrence has to remain credible. There is also a fundamental conceptual issue related to missile defences which does not get the attention it deserves.

Traditionally offence and defence have competed with each other throughout the history of military conflict and wars. The fundamental difference that one has to note is that so far, any error of judgement in relation to what defence or offence could do in relation to that of the adversary's capability, the maximum that could happen was defeat or victory. But where nuclear weapons are concerned, shifting the deterrence paradigm from an offence only (which exploited the vulnerability of the other side to provide stability between nuclear-armed countries) to one that combines offensive as well as defensive capabilities could produce catastrophic results since, at one level, an error of judgement about the efficacy of defence could provide greater incentive for offensive action, and at another any failure of defence would result not merely in defeat, but in a holocaust of horrendous dimensions. States under these circumstances are more likely to resort to pre-emptive offensive in order to seek strategic advantage. At the same time, since defensive capabilities would not be symmetrical, strategic stability would become far more difficult to establish. There is also the problem of countries seeking counter-missile defence capabilities. In many cases these could only come from asymmetric strategies, including the promotion of international terrorism. The risks of such terrorism with weapons of mass destruction are likely to increase in future especially since political movement toward abolition of such weapons has perceptibly slowed down.

Weaponisation of Space

There is a perceptible move toward weaponisation of space intrinsically tied to the issue of missile defences and increasing militarisation of space. Space assets are increasingly being used for war-fighting capabilities even if mostly for combat support functions like military communications, early warning of missile launch etc. Most of the scenarios of anti-ballistic missiles, especially the boost phase interception technology would require weapons deployments in space. The risk of nuclear weapons in space also remains. The deployment of missile defences would inevitably increase the militarisation and weaponisation of space and a new arms race is likely to result. Anti-satellite weaponry and strategies are likely to gain strength in the coming years creating serious problems for even the peaceful uses of space.

At the same time there is a belief, supported now by a number of new developments that the international order after the end of Cold War has become unipolar. Certainly the United States is the most complete power with capabilities that continue to remain unmatched by any other state. The fact that the US has the support of nearly two dozen or so developed industrialised states, who are mostly military allies, adds to its capabilities especially in dealing with strategic and security issues across the globe in a manner that allows it substantive freedom of action. The promised US resort to pre-emption in the use of force under a new "Bush Doctrine," therefore, certainly adds to the concerns about increasing unilateralism (with or without its allies) by the United States. In the process multilateral forums, especially the UN and its agencies have been marginalised. This hold out the risk of increasing unilateralism by other states contributing to the growth of an anarchical international order. Such unliateralism could be resorted to not only by the powerful states, but even by the weaker states by pursuing strategies of asymmetric conflict.

The new Bush Doctrine of pre-emption in the use of force would set a negative example since the more powerful states, like the United States itself, would tend to pursue unilateralist

policies putting international and multilateral co-operation, and possibly even restraints, at serious risks. The threat to go to war against Iraq represents a live situation where even the close allies of the US are deeply apprehensive of the direction of US policy.
The classical case emanating from this doctrine at present that affects security in Asia (and Europe to an extent) is the threat of war against Iraq. The hype in the US over invading Iraq has been building up. The case for this war as made out in public is weak at its best. Only a year ago US Secretary of State Colin Powell was arguing that "smart sanctions" could contain the emerging threat of an aggressive Iraq, and the president's national security adviser, Condoleeza Rice, was advocating "a sanctions regime that actually works". The major change that has taken place since then is that President Bush has formally declared Iraq as part of the three-country "axis of evil". But the threat that would demand a war is not clear at all, and the US administration has not yet made it clear to its own Congress or had it debated there. Existing UN Security Council resolutions require that any use of force against Iraq would require its prior authority to make it legal. Unfortunately, the US war juggernaut has been on the move for some time now and its own momentum could push the country into a war. A war which, in present circumstances, would not have a legal sanction, would be a logistic nightmare, would be militarily costly and unpredictable, and would be politically imprudent. Even in case of a miracle military victory, the nature of a successor regime and its policies would remain a matter of speculation for years to come. In the absence of visible justification, anti-American sentiment among Muslim populations would only grow with far reaching consequences. Such a war would detract everyone from an already stagnating international war against terrorism.

Terrorism or sub-conventional war?

The world changed after September 11, 2001 in many ways and the contours of that change are not entirely clear even after a year. It would be insufficient to describe the terrorist attacks on the United States as simple acts of terrorism driven no doubt by religious extremist ideology and the belief in violence as a means of dispute solving. Terrorism in various ways is as old as human conflict. It has been employed in various ways with the object of imposing one's will on the other party through fear, as an old Chinese proverb says, to `kill one and frighten ten thousand.' Large parts of the world have been subject and object of terrorism during the second half of the twentieth century. Even the United States has been a target of international terrorism, in the attack on the World Trade Centre in the early 1990s, in Oklahoma City, and in East Africa, Saudi Arabia etc. in more recent years. We in India have been a conscious target of international terrorism for more than 17 years. Many other examples can be cited. So what is different with September 11?
What was witnessed by a large part of the world on that day was a live demonstration on the electronic media of suicide attacks with four hijacked civil airliners on the core of the elements of power of the sole super power. By definition a super power must be invulnerable to attack by any other power. It was the demonstrated vulnerability of the super power that destroyed its image of invincibility. The impact has been even greater since the sole super power had only a decade ago declared victory when the next most powerful state in the world had collapsed after more than four decades of confrontation and conflict. The impact has been further intensified by the use of a novel method of simply flying hijacked unarmed civil airliners into the buildings with the clear intention not so much to kill a large number of people but to display the ability of the attacker to cause grievous harm to the state and society in the United States. The overall aim was no doubt to create a strong possibly disproportionate reaction to the act as well as broadcast to the people of the world of the vulnerabilities of the modern state and society. If the core of the most powerful state in the world was vulnerable to attack and destruction by a groups of religious extremists through surely all countries,

especially liberal democracies would remain even more vulnerable to the phenomenon of international terrorism.
US response under the circumstances was to be expected except that what Washington, to its great credit, actually undertook was a much more calibrated response rather than adopting a sledgehammer approach. In spite of the comparatively narrower concerns of each country there was not only global sympathy but also active co-operation with the United States in dealing with international terrorism. Special efforts were made to emphasise the proper dimensions of the problem being international terrorism and hence the war against the phenomenon, its leadership and infrastructure rather than a fight against Islam or any particular country. India, with the world's second largest Muslim population, with its decades old experience of transnational terrorism and combating it, promptly offered full co-operation to the United States. And this provided a special impetus to the war against terrorism even by the Muslim countries. This is also the reason why President Bush's recent nomenclature of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil" came under criticism even from US allies.

The Third World War?

Given the nature of events that led to September 11 and even more what has followed, it is possible to hypothesize that the fateful day of September last marked the beginning of a virtual Third World War. This is a war distinctly different from the earlier world wars, but still total in nature and perhaps even more vicious since the target of one adversary in that war is the innocents of the world. The war is not against a particular country, religion or civilisation but against a phenomenon which has its roots in a combination of diverse factors. This is not to suggest that countries and their governments, or religious groups and ideology, or other factors like the Cold War and its debris in the shape of a phenomenal spread of weapons of military specifications into civil society have not played a crucial part in promoting or prosecuting terrorism, but to acknowledge that the implications extend far beyond the national boundaries. In fact the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan played a crucial role in shaping the current war. The nature of change in war has been clearly discernible in recent decades although the tendency was to see it in essentially national terms. But if we probe beyond the immediate and nationalist perceptions a couple of mega-trends can be identified which would make this war not all that easy to win even if the international community finally gets down to fighting it out. A number of such factors are briefly examined here to focus on the security challenges and policy options that the international community faces.
Firstly, asymmetry has always played a crucial role in warfare. With modern means of warfare and the heightened vulnerability of states to conventional war, the probability of such wars has been reducing. During the Cold War the two super powers and their allies conducted numerous "proxy wars" essentially as the means of indirect warfare. But most of such wars were being fought on the basis of generating asymmetry. The Viet Cong against the United States in Vietnam and the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are prime examples. Ideology played a key role in both cases. In the first case the ideology was based on communism while in the latter case religion was promoted as the ideological foundation (against communist Soviet Union). As it is ideology has been playing an increasing role in warfare during the 20th century. Introduction and support of religion-based ideology of Mujahideen (and the implicit militant *jehad* in the name of Islam) by the United States through Pakistan as the "front-line state" marked a major change in the strategy and tactics of the asymmetric warfare for political goals.
Secondly, efforts to legitimize the use of religion for political goals and violence in the name of religion was being legitimized in Pakistan well before even the first Afghanistan war of the 1980s. In fact the use of terror in the name of religion itself had been sought since the 1970s. One of the prime examples of the legitimacy to terrorism has come from Pakistani military

leadership that has been running the country during most of its existence. Pakistani leadership not only introduced greater Islamisation in society after 1971, but its military leadership actively sought to rationalise the use of terror as being sanctified by religion. As Pakistan moved towards greater Islamisation in the 1970s, it also sought increased inspiration from the religion for its strategic doctrine. General Zia as the head of state and the army encouraged such efforts. Brigadier S. K. Malik has (fundamentally erroneously) interpreted the Holy Quran in search for guidelines, and has placed a strong emphasis on the interpretation that the Holy Quran enjoins upon the believers to use terror as a weapon of war. "The Quranic military strategy" Malik wrote, "thus enjoins us to *prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, known or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being terror-stricken by the enemy*" (emphasis in original).[i] The book teaches that terror must be struck during the preparatory stage, in the run up to war, during war, and for war termination. Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies, therefore, "is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the ends meet and merge." Later army chief General Aslam Beg and other army leaders inevitably quoted these conclusions to exhort the officers when addressing them, especially at the senior training establishments.

The result has been to alter the classical Clausewitzean doctrine that war is an extension of politics by other means to a new prescription that war through terror would be an instrument of politics and foreign policy/military strategy by other (non-diplomatic and non-military) means. External role in violence inside another state has been increasing. Distinction between domestic terrorism and international terrorism has been diffusing due to greater external involvement in internal terrorist violence in a country. Today there is hardly any significant domestic armed conflict that does not actively receives political support, weapons, substantive financial assistance and safe havens beyond the borders where terrorist acts are committed.

Thirdly, terrorism has been shifting from its traditional political orientation to religious-ideology driven violence. Compared to their near absence three decades ago, today religious groups constitute over two-third of the militant/terrorist entities in the world. Ideological reasons had driven the Cold War and its hot segment, the proxy wars. Toward the end of Cold War religion was increasingly exploited for political and ideological purposes especially in Afghanistan to provide motivation for war and violence. The nearly two-decade war in Afghanistan was fuelled and sustained by religion-based ideological factors -- domestic, regional, and global. Religion is coming to play an increasing role in politics even in states that have pursued liberal democratic or socialist ideologies. International security is consequently affected seriously, because "...the combination of religion and politics is potentially explosive. The combination of religion and nationalism is stronger, but a blend of the three has an extremely destructive potential."[ii]

The result has been that war has undergone some fundamental changes in recent decades. The risks and consequences of a nuclear war remain with us as long as such weapons are not eliminated. Conventional wars are no longer viable since the basic rationale of territory as a source of material and manpower resources as in earlier periods has been almost totally eroded by changed political dimensions provided by de-colonisation, democracy and the high political awareness of populations. The economic means of production also are no longer dependent upon natural resources (except for oil and gas) as in earlier periods. Traditional conventional war therefore has become less likely. Even when fought it would have limited impact beyond the military forces except where the political and economic costs of that war become high. For this reason, rather than territory per se, conventional wars would remain in vogue for a long time.

The most relevant issue for our discussion is that these trends are essentially centered in Asia, and to some extent, Europe. Afghanistan and Pakistan have been the epicentre of global terrorism for more than a decade now. Al Qaeda's networks are no doubt global, but mostly

concentrated in Asia from Egypt to the Philippines. And the challenge is not far from being neutralised even after a year since the internal war against terrorism commenced in earnest in which almost all countries are willingly co-operating. Most of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders have not yet been neutralised and apparently live with a degree of freedom in Pakistan. Pakistan's own leadership is undoubtedly under pressure to co-operate in the war against terrorism; but it is also sensitive to the jehadi Islamist groups who wish to perpetuate the holy war through terrorist violence.

Security Structure for the Future

Multiple level approaches would be needed if we are to address the complex challenges to security in Asia and Europe. At the apex, of course, would be the global approach to international peace and security issues. The UN Charter provides a model approach in terms of the principles. But the problems of increasing marginalisation of the UN have been increasing because the UN structure is no longer representative of the geo-political realities in which international peace and security must be maintained. At the core is the question of the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council. Its membership will need to be increased earlier rather than later. Japan, Germany and India are the obvious candidates for permanent membership besides any other that can make the requisite contribution. It may be recalled that Indian delegation was present at the meetings when the UN in 1945 was set up essentially because of India's contribution to the restoration of international peace and security during the Second World War, although it was not an independent country at that time.

Secondly, all countries must make conscious efforts to ensure that the UN plays its designated role and unilateralism in issues affecting international peace and security must be discouraged. Thirdly, multilateral forum for arms control and disarmament must be rejuvenated and the current trend reversed. Bilateral agreements (like Panchsheel, China-India Agreements of 1993 and 1996, Simla Agreement of 1972 between Pakistan and India, and other such measures) should be encouraged. Sub-regional structures like the ARF and CICA desrve to be further strengthen so that countries in Asia can start to look for solutions to security challenges through their own approaches.

Co-operative Peace in Asia

The nature and extent of relationship between the United States and China is likely to become the central strategic factor in the world in general, and Asia in particular. No other single country except the two themselves, including Japan, may be able to influence this process. Any polarization caused by the policies of either country will lead to difficult choices for others, and risks expediting polarization of the international order, with far reaching consequences for the future. The worse case scenario, of course, would be a return to a bipolar confrontation, somewhat reminiscent of the just-ended Cold War. Some people believe that an incipient Cold War has already begun on this basis. China sees the redefined and strengthened US-Japan security alliance (constructed against USSR, which dissolved seven years ago) relationship as directed toward it; while the expansion of NATO, especially if it includes Russia more deeply at a future date, appears to China as another step in its "containment" or "strategic competitor" relationship (and to others as the sign of formalizing a North-South divide).

On the other hand, it is quite likely that the US may move closer to China in pursuit of its engagement policy especially since domestic prosperity in the United States (which has replaced foreign policy goals of the Cold War in terms of presidential priorities) is increasingly dependent on co-operative relations with China. The US appears to find it difficult to adjust to the fundamental changes taking place in the world, and seems to be trying to manage an Asian "balance of power" by itself being the (sole) balancer. For

Asia, the question will remain whether this is the best approach to managing the future; and, more important, will this approach succeed?

Retrenchment of its strategic presence in the Pacific rim has already led to the US strategic shift forward into the North-western Indian Ocean region and Central Asia. Although the redefinition of US-Japan alliance holds the promise of strengthened presence, all other indications point toward reduction of US presence in the West Pacific, and possible shift southward from where it would be able to play a more effective role in protecting US interests. These may not necessarily coincide with the interests of most Asian countries, especially if there is a tension or conflict of interest among the key players of Asia. Future energy scenarios tend to indicate that the US will need to focus even more on the region of Central and South West Asia. Barring what China can establish directly via overland routes, all other supplies of current and future energy supplies not under Russian control must pass through northern Indian Ocean region.

In view of the strategic uncertainties most Asian countries tend to agree that after the end of Cold War US presence in Asia is a positive factor of stability. But it is difficult to visualise any major US military presence on Asian landmass on the Pacific Rim by 2010 especially once North Korea normalises its relations with neighbours. Many East Asian countries, in fact, would be greatly concerned about what is seen as reducing US commitment in Asia and the Pacific Rim renewed US-Japan security guidelines notwithstanding. India, which used to be deeply disturbed about the US military presence in the Indian Ocean (essentially because it brought the Cold War to its shores) is far more relaxed about this presence now that the Cold War is no more and Indo-US relations have been on the upswing. There is a growing convergence of US-Indian strategic interests related to ensuring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region (where nearly 3.8 million Indian expatriates bolster local economies) and access to energy resources especially in the longer term perspective. But the key issue here is not merely that of US presence; but much more of the terms of its engagement. For example, US engagement in the Persian Gulf has increased since 1983 and dramatically after September 11 last. Circumstances made this necessary. But the pursuit of a containment policy toward Iran in post-Cold War era raises many doubts about the feasibility and desirability of such an approach, especially when most of the allies of the US are not willing to lend full weight to this approach. Similarly, US role in South Asia in the past in pursuit of its own strategic interests has been, if anything, divisive.

India has seen co-operative relations among Asian countries as essential to peace in the region as well as global level. India had called the Asian Relations conference in 1947 months before it became independent where Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised the need for greater co-operation for peace. The Panchsheel Agreement with China in 1954 was an effort to establish the norms and principles for co-operative peace. Similarly, the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement with Pakistan also sought the same objective through mutual co-operation. It needs to be recognised that while peace and security in Northeast Asia requires co-operation among the US, Japan, Koreas, Russia and China, in Southern Asia co-operative relationship among China, Russia, the US and India are critical to peace and prosperity.

How shall we approach the issues? There will be a need to agree on basic principles and build actual measures on agreed principles. Fundamentally, the UN Charter and the India-China Panchsheel Agreement provide the basic framework. Essentially, the modern sovereign nation-state system intrinsically generates a competitive paradigm of inter-state security. The principle of collective security built into the covenant of the League of Nations did not succeed because of clash of interests of some of the major powers. If the 21st century is to be made safer, and Asia is to find the direction to achieve that, a paradigm shift to co-operative peace and security would be necessary. Here we have a framework constructed by the international Commission for a New Asia which had devoted a great deal of thought and time to evolve the principles for co-operative peace and security in Asia.[iii] Conscious effort is

required to take these principles to their logical conclusion in terms of pursuit of policy. The focus for the future must be on seeking harmony and equilibrium rather than balance of power based on the fourteen principles proposed by the Commission for a New Asia in the early 1990s which are listed below:

1. Commitment to peace as a pre-condition for human development. Peace and security, therefore, must be sought in an integrated approach to ensure harmonisation at the global, regional , national, societal and individual level,
2. Recognition that the right to life with peace and security must be treated as an inalienable human right.
3. Respect for the sovereignty of states, and co-operative rejection of all attempts to compromise state sovereignty,
4. Acceptance of the principle of mutual and equal security, military sufficiency and the maintenance of military balances at the lowest possible levels.
5. Recognition that all states -- large and small, rich and poor -- are equal, respect for the equality of states and co-operative rejection of all attempts to compromise the principle of equality,
6. Co-operative rejection of any attempt at hegemonism, imperialism, colonialism and political dominance, whether these be from regional or external Powers,
7. Refraining from the direct or indirect use of force, and co-operative rejection of all illegitimate use or threat of use of force, either by Asian or non-Asian Powers,
8. Respect for the territorial integrity of states, and co-operative rejection of any attempt to violate the territorial integrity of states,
9. Commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes, and co-operative pro-active action to encourage or ensure the pacific settlement of disputes,
10. Respect for the inviolability of frontiers and mutually accepted lines of control, and co-operative rejection of any attempt to violate them,
11. The construction of processes of conflict prevention, confidence-building, and conflict management and resolution, at the bilateral and multilateral levels,
12. Respect for national self determination and the recognition of the right of each country to choose and develop its own political and economic system, including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,
13. Respect for fundamental comprehensive human rights and freedoms, and co-operative rejection of all gross violations of fundamental and comprehensive human rights and freedoms, and
14. The deliberate construction of comprehensive Cupertino between states, including economic Cupertino, based on the principle of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

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[i] SK Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, Wajidalis, Lahore 1979, p. 58-59. For example, General Zia ul-Haq as the Chief Marshal Law Administrator wrote the foreword recommending the book written by Brigadier SK Malik of Pakistan Army in late 1970s who argued, in a self-serving mis-interpretation, that the Holy Quran teaches the use of terror as a weapon against the enemy. See SK Malik, p. 58-59. Stephen Steve Cohen had argued that Pakistani military officers on courses in the United States over the years were more interested in studying guerrilla warfare from the perspective of waging it (unlike the American officers who studies it to learn how to combat it). See Stephen Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1984, p.34.

[ii] Falih Abd al Jabbar, "The Gulf War and ideology: the double-edged sword of Islam" in Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds) *The Gulf War and the New World Order* (Zed Books, London, 1991) P. 217.

[iii] *Towards a New Asia,* Report of the international Commission for a New Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 1994