Venezuela Gears up for Elections

A certain tension can be felt in the air in Venezuela. For the first time in years, the right-wing opposition believes it has a real chance of winning the presidential election on 28 July. In a change from the often violent coup attempts of recent years, they have now been striving for a shift in power at the ballot box. Despite far-from-ideal conditions, the leading opposition alliance Unitary Democratic Platform (Plataforma Unitaria Democrática, PUD) was able to agree on a joint candidacy, and on 28 July former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia will challenge incumbent Nicolás Maduro.

Originally, the PUD alliance only nominated González as a placeholder in order to buy time after the candidacy was denied to opposition leader María Corina Machado. The national electoral council also refused candidacy to substitute candidate Corina Yoris, an 80 year-old professor with no experience in political office.

Alongside González, there are eight other moderate government opponents running (all of them men), most of whom criticize the PUD alliance as “bought” opposition. Left-wing opposition candidacies, on the other hand, were not even allowed. In August of last year, the Supreme Court intervened in the structure of the Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela, PCV), which had already split with Maduro in 2020. As had previously happened with other parties, the court transferred control of the PCV — including all names and symbols — to government-affiliated leadership, even though no PCV members are currently in government. The state-hijacked PCV now supports Maduro, who appears a total of 13 times on the electronic ballot thanks to the backing of various minor parties. González, the most important contender for the presidency, appears only three times.

Clearly the government was banking on the assumption that the majority opposition would not be able to agree on a joint replacement candidate for Machado.

Ultimately, the government was forced to accept González’ candidacy, which had been registered well in advance — even his allies, such as Brazilian President Lula and his Colombian counterpart Gustavo Petro, had publicly spoken out in favour of democratic elections in Venezuela. Meanwhile, negotiations with the opposition and the US government were also taking place behind the scenes. Shortly before an agreement was reached on González, the US put an end to the easing of its sanctions against Venezuela on the grounds that the government had not made sufficient efforts to ensure transparent elections.

The Barbados Agreement

The agreement reached in Barbados in October 2023 between the government and the opposition stipulated that the presidential election would be held in the second half of 2024, and that political parties would be able to determine their candidates according to their own rules. Additionally, there were to be comprehensive electoral guarantees and robust election monitoring.

This agreement was also possible because the US, which imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela in 2017, participated in the negotiations as well. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, the US government has had a renewed interest in Venezuelan oil — Russia had largely replaced previous oil exports from Venezuela to the US since 2017, but could no longer serve as a supplier due to new wartime sanctions. Immediately after the agreement was signed, the US authorised both trade and investment in oil, gas and gold in Venezuela.

However, from the point of view of the US and all involved opposition parties, the terms of the agreement were not implemented adequately. In particular, no resolution was reached on the most controversial issue: the ban on María Corina Machado, by far the most prominent opposition politician, from running for office. Such bans can be imposed without an order from the Court of Auditors in cases of corruption or misappropriation of public funds, but since they involve administrative decisions that are often not transparent, the practice is highly controversial. In practice, the government makes use of this instrument arbitrarily, and the real reason behind the ban is most likely that the government simply finds Machado unacceptable as a presidential candidate. She has belonged to the right-wing fringe of the opposition for over twenty years, and in recent years has spoken out in favour of sanctions and even US military intervention in Venezuela, though she is now taking a more moderate stance. In October 2023, Machado won a preliminary election organised by the opposition itself, and has since been considered the presumptive presidential candidate. However, following review, the Supreme Court confirmed the ban on her and other opposition candidates from running for office.

At the beginning of March, after meetings with various political parties and interest groups, the government-affiliated national electoral council scheduled election day for 28 July — the birthday of former President Hugo Chávez, who died in 2013. This meant that the opposition was finally faced with the decision to either stick with Machado with no chance of victory, or to agree on a less prominent alternative, a strategy under which it triumphed in the last regional elections in Barinas, a symbolically important state for Chávez followers.

Economic policy of recent years — partially the result of sanctions — has eased fears of a right-wing takeover in many sectors of society.

Clearly the government was banking on the assumption that the majority opposition would not be able to agree on a joint replacement candidate for Machado. At the same time, they doubled down on repressive tactics. This has meant months of repeated arrests of members of Machado’s immediate entourage, as well as human rights organisations, for alleged plans to stage a coup. The PUD alliance, however, has not let these repressive measures deter them from their new strategy of gaining power through elections.

Maduro or González?

Both the government and the opposition seem confident of victory, having both begun their electoral campaigns months ago, despite July marking the official launch. The challenge for the right-wing opposition consists in transferring Machado’s high approval ratings over to the largely unknown and less charismatic González. The election campaign began in the streets, almost exclusively run by Machado, who made dozens of appearances in various states well before the campaign had officially launched. The government, however, countered each and every appearance with a rally of their own in the same region. In several cases, different authorities subsequently imposed sanctions on hotels and restaurants that Machado had visited on her campaign trail.

Content-wise, the election campaign itself has been lacklustre. The government is attempting to build on Chavez’ discourse, although its policies have for years been marked by non-transparent economic liberalisation, restrictions on liberal and basic democratic rights and state inefficiency under the pressure of sanctions. Machado and González, on the other hand, are striving to liberalize the economy, not just behind the scenes but officially, and therefore represent a more neoliberal approach. Furthermore, they seek to restaff the institutions and free people they regard as political prisoners.

Contrary to what the opposition believes, victory is by no means certain.

Dissatisfaction with the government has even extended into spheres that previously supported Chávez. Furthermore, economic policy of recent years — partially the result of sanctions — has eased fears of a right-wing takeover in many sectors of society. Since price controls were lifted and US dollars were permitted as a means of payment, almost anything can be bought on the market, and even inflation is mostly back under control. Salaries, however, remain extremely low. Younger people in particular, who were not politicised under Chávez, associate terms like Chavezism and socialism with an inefficient, self-serving government.

Should González win, Machado would no doubt take on an important political role, for example as an advisor or retroactively appointed Vice-President. The fact that a political shift currently only seems feasible with Machado as the opposition leader — steering Venezuela’s foreign policy towards alignment with Argentina’s right-wing libertarian president Javier Milei and (in the case of a Republican victory in the US elections) Donald Trump — seems to be a rather minor issue in the public eye.

What Comes After the Election?

Contrary to what the opposition believes, victory is by no means certain. Both the opposition and the government point to polls conducted by institutions close to them, which tend to show their own party as being ahead by 20 to 30 percent. Taking into account the individual institutes’ reputations, however, the opposition seems to be at an advantage so far.

Another point in favour of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV) is that it is the only political power with well-established campaign apparatus and a nationwide presence. Moreover, of the over seven million Venezuelans who emigrated during the crisis and overwhelmingly rejected the Maduro government, only a fraction will be able to vote abroad.

Looking ahead to the day after the election, the uncertainty among the population is palpable, while the opposition is exuding such confidence in their own victory that it can hardly seem to fathom the possibility of defeat. If González does in fact win, negotiations with the government would be essential — even with a victory the current opposition would still be up against all other state institutions. Furthermore, a new parliament — which could lead to a reshuffling of the Supreme Court — would not be elected until next year, and since, according to the constitution, the handing-over of office would not take place until 10 January 2025, the current government would itself remain in office for another five months after its defeat.

In contrast to Machado, González, a former diplomat who served as the Ambassador to Argentina under Chávez until 2002, is considered by many observers to be better suited to moderating the transition phase if there is a change in government. However, Manduro and other top Chávez-supporting officials have so much to lose that an orderly handover of power seems practically inconceivable. Not only would it be a matter of losing privileges, but also of eventual legal persecution. After all, the opposition does indeed harbour punitive sentiments that favour vengeance over reconciliation. For their part, the US authorities have even offered a bounty of $15 million for Maduro’s capture.

If González does in fact win, it would undoubtedly cause tensions among Chávez supporters in terms of how to deal with the result. Disregarding the will of the voters would come at a high political cost for the government, as it ultimately wants to increase its political legitimacy and bring about an end to sanctions. Other possible scenarios — such as a coup d’etat, postponing the election, or a short-term ban on candidacy for González — do not currently seem to be on the cards. The fact that the US government and the Maduro camp resumed face-to-face talks at the beginning of July could be an indication that the election will take place as planned. However, the question of whether peace will prevail afterwards still looms.

The sector of the Left that is critical of the government has hardly any role to play in this year’s election.

The nationwide presence of opposition witnesses at voting stations — in order to compare the electronically delivered results with the paper printouts from voting machines — will play a particularly important role in the legitimization of the election results (all political parties are allowed to have such witnesses present for the counting of printouts at polling stations). Meanwhile, the international election monitoring process agreed upon in October has only just begun to materialize. The government initially sent invitations to the EU, the UN and the US-based Carter Center, but the national electoral council subsequently rescinded the EU’s invitation, officially due to EU sanctions against Venezuelan government politicians which are still in force. The UN has four representatives present, whose only job is to draft an internal report. The Carter Center is more strongly represented, though it will also only be able to partially cover the electoral process.

Meanwhile, the sector of the Left that is critical of the government has hardly any role to play in this year’s election. Due to a lack of authorized rival candidates on the Left, there is no unified position to rally behind. Some former Chávez supporters such as ex-minister Héctor Navarro are vocally supporting González. The “real” Communist Party, which lost the right to its party symbols after legal intervention, is now supporting the moderate opposition candidate Enrique Márquez. A further group of Chávez-supporting dissidents, including the leftist human rights organization Surgentes, are not calling for the election of a particular candidate, but have instead launched “The Other Campaign” (La Otra Campaña). The goal is to strengthen a new Left from the grassroots up, through open debate. However, it is questionable whether such a strategy can succeed, given current conditions. Regardless of the outcome of the election, it is already clear that Venezuela is heading for turbulent times.

This article first appeared in nd.aktuell in cooperation with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Translated by Guerrilla Media Collective.