Only International Pressure Can Stop the War

As the war in Gaza spills over into Lebanon, the fact remains that without a ceasefire, the Israeli hostages cannot be freed and the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip cannot be improved. Much more robust international mediation and international security guarantees would be necessary to stop the killing.

But even if a ceasefire were reached and the fighting temporarily stopped, how could the region move forward? Is there any way to ensure that a ceasefire is more than just a pause before the next round of fighting?

In late September, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Katja Hermann spoke with researcher Muriel Asseburg about the conflict dynamics in Israel-Palestine, the role played by Germany and the international community, and what post-war scenarios for Gaza and the wider region could look like.

One year into the war in Gaza, there is still no end in sight. The horrifying news and images coming out of the Gaza Strip are almost unbearable. Aid organizations have long been sounding the alarm, and Israel’s actions have been vehemently condemned by international politicians and political analysts. What do you think needs to happen to finally reach a deal for the release of the Israeli hostages and a ceasefire in Gaza?

The international community would have to exert considerably more pressure on all parties in the conflict in order to change the cost-benefit analysis of the main decision-makers within the Israeli government and Hamas. It would require that continuing the conflict be made more costly both politically and materially than a permanent ceasefire.

This poses two main challenges: the international community’s leverage on the Hamas leadership in Gaza is very limited, and clear signals to the Israeli government indicating that the international community does not support the continuation and expansion of the war contradict signals intended to show Iran and its allies that the international community stands by Israel’s side.

However, without a ceasefire there cannot be a freeing of the hostages or an improvement of the humanitarian situation in Gaza — without a ceasefire, it is not possible to transition towards a political resolution of the conflict and contain the regional escalation. Therefore, it is necessary to significantly increase the pressure on all parties involved in the conflict — especially on Prime Minister Netanyahu — to achieve a ceasefire and a hostage exchange.

A draft version of a deal, to which the Hamas leadership has essentially agreed, has been in existence since May. The Israeli defence minister as well as important members of the security establishment — and, of course, the families of the hostages —have also been calling for a deal.

Even after a deal is reached, any sustainable political solution capable of bringing about long-lasting peace must consider the interests and needs of both sides. For Palestinians, this necessarily includes an end to the occupation and the blockade of the Gaza Strip. What scenarios are being discussed that take into account these demands, which are now even backed by many international actors?

The United States, the European Union, and the Arab Contact Group agree on a few basic principles: There should be no permanent Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip, no reduction of the Strip’s territory, and no permanent displacement of the Palestinian population. A revitalized Palestinian Authority should take control of Gaza, possibly with the support of international actors on the ground. This should be accompanied by a return to a peace process that, in the medium term, leads to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Israel should also be more deeply integrated into the region, including through the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia.

However, the international community faces major hurdles in implementing this vision. For one, the Israeli government is not ready to accept a two-state solution — instead, its far-right factions are calling for the resettlement of the Gaza Strip and are driving forward the annexation of the West Bank. In recent months, Israel has also created a large buffer zone in Gaza and has taken steps to keep a permanent presence there, namely in the Netzarim Corridor [which splits the Strip into a northern and a southern zone] and in the Philadelphi Corridor [located along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt]. Also, there is no end in sight to the blockade imposed on the Strip.

The catastrophe that is currently unfolding in Israel and the Palestinian territories will have a lasting impact on the lives and attitudes of many in the region.

Without a process towards a sustainable political settlement, Arab states will have little incentive to get involved in the reconstruction of Gaza or to participate in the stabilization of the Strip with a presence on the ground. Saudi Arabia has also unequivocally stated that the normalization of its relations with Israel is dependent on irreversible steps towards the creation of a Palestinian state.

In addition, it is likely that Hamas will continue to hold veto power after the war, while the Palestinian Authority has been severely weakened. The Palestinian Authority has little legitimacy among the population, its financial situation is precarious, and it has long since lost control over the cities and refugee camps in the northern West Bank. Given this, it would need at least Hamas’s tacit agreement to take control of the Gaza Strip.

Another crucial issue to clarify is how the administration and the civilian security forces of the de facto government could be integrated into a post-war order. Having Hamas participate in this government would not only pose a problem for the Israeli government — since Netanyahu has proclaimed a “complete victory” over Hamas to be one of the aims of the war — but would also be rejected by the Israeli population after the atrocities of 7 October.

As you pointed out, dealing with the Islamist Hamas, the organization primarily responsible for the 7 October attacks, will certainly be a challenge when it comes to post-war scenarios. Excluding Hamas does not seem to be in the best interest of Palestinians, as it is seen as an integral part of the Palestinian population. However, Hamas’s involvement is also problematic given previous events and the profile of the organization. What would you recommend in this regard?

I think it is of utmost importance to have a Palestinian leadership that is capable of speaking for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and of making binding decisions. Today, we have a situation in which Hamas and Israel are negotiating (indirectly) with each other. This gives Hamas a great deal of influence. The Palestinian Authority, on the other hand, has little sway over the situation.

Overcoming the internal divisions among Palestinians is essential to having a responsible leadership that can decide over matters of war and peace and effectively coordinate post-war reconstruction. It is also crucial to restore the separation of powers and democratic procedures in the Palestinian territories.

At present, a representative Palestinian leadership cannot be established without Hamas — or at least without Hamas’s approval. But ultimately, this leadership role should not be based solely on agreements between Palestinian factions. In the medium term, the Palestinian government should be elected in free and fair elections (insofar as this is possible under occupation).

Whether militant groups like Hamas, which stands for armed struggle, or those who believe in international law and want to achieve a peaceful settlement with Israel will have greater influence in the future Palestinian arena will mainly depend on which of these approaches seems most promising.

Many political analysts are convinced that any sustainable post-war scenario would require the support of third parties. Do you share this view? What could this look like in practice?

Indeed, right now it seems that the parties involved in the conflict are not able to find a way out of the spiral of escalation without international mediation. I do believe a much more robust international mediation with an international presence on the ground, security guarantees from the international community, and a strong international commitment to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip is necessary to reach a durable agreement.

A solution that respects the right to self-determination of both peoples and addresses the refugee question based on international law and mutual agreement will hardly emerge from the local populations at the moment. Jewish Israelis and Palestinians are heavily traumatized, and 7 October and the war in Gaza have re-awakened collective traumas on both sides.

It is awful to see lives, dreams, hopes, and futures being wiped out by inhumane policies, unbridled violence, and a thirst for vengeance.

Because of this, those involved in the conflict have almost no empathy for the victims on the other side and are unwilling to distinguish between combatants and civilians. The reciprocal dehumanization and exclusive claims to the whole territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea have become extreme, as shown by surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the University of Tel Aviv.

Germany has been one of the largest (financial) donors to Palestine for years. Yet, over the past year, the German government’s political proximity to Israel, perceived in Palestine as one-sided partisanship, has damaged its credibility as a reliable partner for development cooperation. There are calls for a boycott of German organizations in Palestine and the wider region, partner organizations are ending collaborations with German counterparts, and employees are resigning. What is your assessment of the situation, and what should happen on the German side to regain trust and credibility? Is this kind of cooperation at risk in the long term?

The credibility of German policy in general, not only in the field of development cooperation, has suffered greatly in the eyes of Palestinians, the Arab world, and other parts of the so-called Global South. This is not only due to Germany’s one-sided support of Israel — which is not merely a perception, but has repeatedly been emphasized by German politicians themselves. Also, the small changes in German policy since 7 October have been barely visible.

Images of the crackdown on solidarity with Palestine in Germany are also a contributing factor. It seems to me that our politicians are not always aware of the international repercussions of measures such as the cancellation of the Palestine Conference in Berlin in April 2024, including the travel and activity bans issued against prominent participants.

Another factor is Germany’s decision to cease cooperating with civil society organizations in the region that have been criminalized or are considered problematic by the Israeli government, or those issuing calls for a boycott, including organizations based in Israel. As a result, Germany is losing many key partner organizations in the region – partners it would actually need for cooperation on issues such as feminist development policy and for building bridges between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians.

Whether this situation will be long-lasting or not will depend, in my opinion, on whether Germany manages to show much more empathy towards non-Jewish victims of the conflict, advocate much more consistently for the implementation of international law, distinguish much more clearly between solidarity with the Israeli civilian population and solidarity with the Israeli government, and commit to supplying humanitarian aid and the reconstruction of Gaza in a way that contributes to Palestinian self-determination.

I would like to finish with a personal question: You have been working for decades on Israel and Palestine, and have been often approached as an analyst and commentator during the war. How do you deal with these harrowing — albeit not surprising — developments, which you have often warned against? How has the last year affected you?

It is awful to see lives, dreams, hopes, and futures being wiped out by inhumane policies, unbridled violence, and a thirst for vengeance. The catastrophe that is currently unfolding in Israel and the Palestinian territories will have a lasting impact on the lives and attitudes of many in the region. Peaceful coexistence, let alone peace, has become a distant prospect.

I am therefore very worried about my friends on the ground. I find it difficult to stomach the helplessness in view of both the devastating dynamics in the Middle East and the polarized debate here in Germany.

Translated by Andrea Garcés and Hunter Bolin for Gegensatz Translation Collective.